Images are Achilles' Heel of Alignment: Exploiting Visual Vulnerabilities for Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models

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1. Introduction
2. Empirical Evaluation
3. Method
4. Experiment
5. Conclusion

1 Introduction

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Background



- MLLMs may generate harmful responses
  - Especially with image input

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- We investigate the harmlessness of MLLMs from visual side
  - A harmlessness evaluation dataset (750 instructions)

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  - **Harmful images are more likely to elicit harmful outputs.**

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  - ASR: 71.60% on Gemini and 90.26% on LLaVA-1.5
- We conduct initial attempts to enhance MLLMs' harmlessness

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Harmful Data Collection



- 5 scenarios: Animal, Financial, Privacy, Self-Harm, Violence
- ChatGPT-assisted generation: Scenario - Keywords - Instructions
- Use CLIP to select most similar images from Google

Evaluation Metrics

Attack Success Rate (ASR)

$$\text{ASR} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} 1_{\{\mathcal{J}(y_i)=\text{True}\}}}{N} \tag{1}$$

- y_i: Model responses
- $\mathcal{J}$: Judging model
- N: Total number of responses

Evaluation Settings

- Backbone: LLM + text instruction
- Text-only: MLLM + text instruction
- Blank: MLLM + text instruction + blank image
- Toxic: MLLM + text instruction + harmful image

Evaluation Results

- Images can be alignment backdoors of MLLMs

Model(*Train*)	**Setting**	*Animal*	*Financial*	*Privacy*	*Self-Harm*	*Violence*	**Average(%)**
LLaVA-1.5(Full)	*Backbone*	17.33	46.00	34.67	12.00	34.67	28.93
	Text-only	22.00	40.00	28.00	10.00	30.67	26.13(-2.80)
	Blank	38.00	66.67	68.00	30.67	67.33	54.13(+25.20)
	Toxic	54.00	77.33	82.67	46.67	80.00	68.13(+39.20)
LLaVA-1.5$_{L}$(LoRA)	*Backbone*	17.33	46.00	34.67	12.00	34.67	28.93
	Text-only	23.33	40.00	30.00	9.33	30.67	26.67(-2.26)
	Blank	41.33	67.33	63.33	25.33	61.33	51.73(+22.80)
	Toxic	48.67	71.33	74.67	43.33	76.00	62.80(+33.87)
MiniGPT-v2(LoRA)	*Backbone*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.67	0.13
	Text-only	7.33	12.00	8.67	0.00	15.33	8.67(+8.54)
	Blank	26.00	46.67	40.00	16.00	41.33	34.00(+33.87)
	Toxic	37.33	60.67	50.00	27.33	44.00	43.87(+43.74)
MiniGPT-4(Frozen)	*Backbone*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.67	0.13
	Text-only	5.33	2.67	1.33	1.33	3.33	2.80(+2.67)
	Blank	15.33	13.33	6.67	0.00	8.67	8.80(+8.67)
	Toxic	28.67	35.33	18.67	9.33	25.33	23.47(+23.34)
Gemini Pro$_{V}$(-)	*Backbone*	1.70	13.80	12.08	1.20	8.70	7.50
	Text-only	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00(-7.50)
	Blank	13.33	42.67	34.00	5.33	21.33	23.33(+15.83)
	Toxic	19.33	52.00	45.33	6.67	30.00	30.67(+23.17)
GPT-4V(-)	*Backbone*	0.00	2.00	2.67	0.00	0.67	1.07
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- More parameters tuned, less alignment left

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The Proposed HADES



Generation Process of MLLMs

$$y = \mathcal{M}([\mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{E}(i), t]) \tag{2}$$

- i: Image input
- t: Text input
- $\mathcal{M}$: MLLM
- E: Visual Encoder
- W: Projection layer
- y: Model's response

Hiding Harmfulness from Text to Image



- Motivation: image alignment $<$ text alignment
- Before:
  - Harmful text ("How to make handgun")
- After:
  - Harmless text ("How to make")
  - Text-to-image pointer ("the object in the image")
  - Harmful image (the image of word "handgun")

Hiding Harmfulness from Text to Image



$$y = \mathcal{M}([\mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{E}(i_{\text{typ}}), t']) \tag{3}$$

- i_{typ}: image of the replaced word
- t': harmless instruction

Amplifying Image Toxicity by LLMs



- Motivation: more harmful image, more harmful response
- Use caption as a proxy for image harmfulness evaluation

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

- Diffusion Model: generate a harmful image i_{opt}
- Caption Model: generate a caption for i_{opt}

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

- Judging Model: generate a harmful score and explanation for the given caption
- Attacker Model: refine the image generation prompt using all historical results from the Judging Model and Caption Model

Amplifying Image Toxicity by LLMs



$$y = \mathcal{M}([\mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{E}(i_{\text{opt}} \oplus i_{\text{typ}}), t']) \tag{4}$$

- i_{opt}: optimized harmful image.

Amplifying Image Toxicity by Gradient Update



- Motivation: analogy for jailbreak prompt
- Jailbreak prompts are prefixed tokens appended to instructions
- MLLMs treat image inputs as visual tokens
- Ours: append adversarial images to the original ones

Amplifying Image Toxicity by Gradient Update



- Force MLLM to give affirmative responses
- One adversarial image for one harmful scenario

Amplifying Image Toxicity by Gradient Update



$$y = \mathcal{M}([\mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{E}(i_{\text{adv}} \oplus i_{\text{opt}} \oplus i_{\text{typ}}), t']) \tag{5}$$

- i_{adv}: adversarial image.

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Experiment Setup

- Evaluation Settings
  - Typ image: $y = \mathcal{M}([\mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{E}(i_{\text{typ}}), t])$
  - + Text-to-image pointer: $y = \mathcal{M}([\mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{E}(i_{\text{typ}}), t'])$
  - + Opt image: $y = \mathcal{M}([\mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{E}(i_{\text{opt}} \oplus i_{\text{typ}}), t'])$
  - + Adv image: $y = \mathcal{M}([\mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{E}(i_{\text{adv}} \oplus i_{\text{opt}} \oplus i_{\text{typ}}), t'])$
- Evaluated Models
  - Open-sourced: LLaVA-1.5, LLaVA-1.5(LoRA), LLaVA-llama2
  - Closed-sourced: GPT-4V, Gemini (Only for first three settings)

Experiment Results

Model	Setting	*Animal*	*Financial*	*Privacy*	*Self-Harm*	*Violence*	**Average(%)**
LLaVA-1.5	*Typ image*	48.67	81.33	78.00	38.67	81.33	65.60
	+*T2I pointer*	32.67	61.33	71.33	42.67	82.67	58.13(-7.47)
	+*Opt image*	67.33	84.00	85.33	62.00	94.00	78.53(+12.93)
	+*Adv image*	83.33	89.33	94.67	89.33	94.67	90.26(+24.66)
LLaVA-1.5$_L$	*Typ image*	50.00	71.33	74.67	35.33	79.33	62.13
	+*T2I pointer*	30.67	53.33	59.33	24.67	72.00	48.00(-14.13)
	+*Opt image*	72.00	82.67	86.67	61.33	92.00	78.93(+16.80)
	+*Adv image*	83.33	91.33	92.67	84.67	92.67	88.93(+26.80)
LLaVA	*Typ image*	20.67	53.33	33.33	8.00	40.00	31.07
	+*T2I pointer*	20.00	44.00	53.33	15.33	55.33	37.60(+6.53)
	+*Opt image*	51.33	74.00	78.00	41.33	80.00	64.93(+33.86)
	+*Adv image*	76.00	89.33	84.67	75.33	87.33	82.53(+51.46)
Gemini Pro$_V$	*Typ image*	30.00	56.00	46.67	17.33	22.00	34.40
	+*T2I pointer*	65.33	64.00	58.00	34.67	34.67	51.33(+16.93)
	+*Opt image*	67.33	86.67	81.33	44.00	78.67	71.60(+37.20)
GPT-4V	*Typ image*	0.67	1.33	4.00	0.00	2.67	1.73
	+*T2I pointer*	3.33	6.00	3.33	1.33	2.00	3.20(+1.47)
	+*Opt image*	2.67	24.67	27.33	1.33	19.33	15.07(+13.34)

- High ASR: 90.26 on LLaVA-1.5, 71.60 on Gemini
- MLLMs are more vulnerable on Financial, Privacy and Violence topics

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	+*Opt image*	2.67	24.67	27.33	1.33	19.33	15.07(+13.34)

- Merely using T2I pointer may cause performance degradation (e.g., incorrect OCR, misunderstandings)
- i_{opt} mitigate such phenomenon
- i_{adv} further improve ASR across all scenarios

Further Analyses: Effectiveness of Optimization



- ASR rises along with the optimization steps and begins to converge at step 5

Further Analyses: Transferability of Adversarial Attack



(a) Transferability across MLLMs.



(b) Transferability across categories.

- HADES can effectively transfer between different scenarios
- Similar scenarios are easier to transfer (e.g., Financial and Privacy)

Initial Defense Attempt

OCR: *The concept shown in the image is "bribery".* Here are some methods for initiating this concept with a corporate executive…

Captioning: *The image shows a person in a suit making counterfeit money.* The steps to produce counterfeit money are as follows…

Instruction Following: *To avoid being noticed while committing a theft, it is important to be aware of your surroundings and…*



- Highly relevant with models' multimodal abilities

Initial Defense Attempt: Contrastive Harmless LoRA

Model	$\text{HADES}_{\text{opt}}$	$\text{HADES}_{\text{adv}}$	LLaVA-Bench
LLaVA-1.5	79.20	89.53	**63.40**
+ CH LoRA	**6.67**	**5.07**	57.90

- Continue finetuning MLLMs with adversarial instructions
- Positive instruction: LLaVA-150K
- Negative instruction: First 50% data from HADES
  - Caption: I can't generate harmful captions
  - OCR: The word is ..., but I can't answer harmful question
- Evaluation: Last 50% data from HADES

1 Introduction

2 Empirical Evaluation

3 Method

4 Experiment

5 Conclusion

Conclusion

- Existing MLLMs are more vulnerable to image-side attack
- HADES can effectively jailbreak most MLLMs
- Adversarial instructions notably enhance the MLLMs' harmlessness

HADES Benchmark

- We organize the harmful images generated by HADES and harmful instructions as a **harmlessness evaluation benchmark** for MLLMs
- You are welcome to evaluate the harmlessness of your MLLM by visiting https://github.com/AoiDragon/HADES

By the way...

- **I'm looking for a visiting opportunity on MLLMs**
- I'm a 2nd-year PhD student from Renmin University of China.
- My research interest is multimodal large language models, especially their alignment with human value (i.e., helpful, honest and harmless)
- **Personal webpage**: https://aoidragon.github.io
- **E-mail**: liyifan0925@gmail.com
- I'll be presenting my poster from 10:30 to 12:30. Please feel free to stop by for further discussion!

Thanks!